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NOTE
THE ATTORNEY, CLIENT AND ... THE
GOVERNMENT?: A NEW DIMENSION TO THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK
PRODUCT PROTECTION IN THE
POST-ENRON ERA
Melissa L. Nuflez*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are the CEO of a large publicly traded corporation.
You just discovered that some of your officers and directors have
manipulated earnings, hidden liabilities, and illegally kept informa-
tion from you and your auditing firm. Now, along with having to
adjust your financial statements and watch your stock price sink, the
Securities and Exchange Commission wants to investigate your corpo-
ration, your management, and you. The SEC asks you for your coop-
eration in its informal investigation. You want to comply because you
would rather make them happy and avoid an official, and very public,
investigation of the corporation and everyone involved. So you turn
over internal investigations and other otherwise privileged materials
in the hopes that you can satisfy the SEC that you are turning the
company around and eliminating the problem. But now your share-
holders, shocked by the drop in their stock value, file a shareholder
derivative action as a result of the accounting irregularities. Because
you have disclosed everything related to the accounting fraud to the
SEC, these shareholders can now discover all of this once privileged
information and your corporation could be swamped in costly litiga-
tion for years, effectively destroying the company and your position in
it.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2007; B.A., Business-
Economics & Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, 2004.
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Today's business culture places a premium on financial honesty
and minimal controversy. Corporations, encouraged by federal legis-
lation, seek to avoid scrutiny by strengthening internal controls that
ensure compliance with securities laws. Yet, the government and pub-
lic still distrust corporations and their directors and officers. This bus-
iness climate has paved the way for increased use of corporate internal
investigations and an increased desire by corporate outsiders to
acquire the information contained in those investigations. Although
corporations have incentives to disclose such information to the gov-
ernment, they have little incentive to disclose it to private parties.'
Corporations often face a difficult decision: If they disclose confiden-
tial material to the government they may thereby be forced to disclose
it to private parties. 2
Over the past three decades, courts have struggled to find rules to
fairly govern discovery of privileged or protected materials after those
materials have been disclosed to a government agency. One method
has been to bar subsequent discovery of materials once protected by
attorney-client privilege under a "limited waiver" theory.- Another
method allows discovery of any materials previously disclosed, whether
they were originally protected by attorney-client privilege or the work
product doctrine, no matter what the circumstances of the disclo-
sure.4 Still another method has allowed the protection provided by
the work product doctrine to survive disclosure to the government
when there has been a confidentiality agreement.5 The circuits that
have decided this issue do not agree and many circuits have yet to
choose how they will approach this issue.
As courts face these issues in the future, they should attempt to
find rules that balance the policy concerns underlying both attorney-
client privilege and work product protection. The Second Circuit did
this best, providing that once a corporation has disclosed protected
materials to the government, the corporation waives its attorney-client
privilege as to those materials. 6 However, if the corporation negoti-
I See, e.g., Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289,
303-06 (6th Cir. 2002).
2 See generally James D. Cox, Insider Trading Regulation and the Production of Infor-
mation: Theory and Evidence, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 475, 488-501 (1986) (analyzing market
incentives for disclosing information).
3 See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc).
4 See, e.g., Tenn. Laborers, 293 F.3d at 303-06.
5 See Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, L.P. (In re Steinhardt
Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993).
6 Id. at 235-36.
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ated with the government for a confidentiality agreement, the corpo-
ration has not waived its work product protection 
over those materials
as to third parties.
7
1. THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE PROBLEM: WHAT 
IT HAS
DONE TO ENCOURAGE DISCLOSURE
A. The Securities and Exchange Commission
Once a corporation has caught the eye of the 
SEC, it potentially
faces serious penalties imposed by the government 
as well as devastat-
ing business consequences resulting from private 
litigation and loss of
investor confidence. The SEC has the ability to 
seek injunctions, resti-
tution, disgorgement, and can also deny corporations 
and individuals
certain privileges, such as precluding individuals 
from being officers
or directors of public companies in the future, 
among other forms of
sanctions.8 In addition, the SEC is authorized 
to refer cases to crimi-
nal authorities, such as the Department ofJustice
.9 As a result, corpo-
rations have great incentives to comply with the 
SEC in the hopes that
such compliance will result in lighter penalties 
or even a decision not
to pursue a formal investigation.'
0
The idea that disclosure may lighten penalties 
resulting from an
investigation is not wishful thinking on the part 
of corporations. The
benefits of cooperation with the SEC by waiving 
attorney-client and
work product privileges can be inferred from the 
cases discussed later
in this Note. 1 The corporations involved in these 
cases likely would
not have disclosed privileged materials to the 
SEC had they not
believed that they would benefit from such disclosure.
But more than this, the SEC itself has made it 
quite clear that
waiving attorney-client and work product privileges 
can substantially
benefit a corporation under investigation. 
In 2001, the SEC
7 Id. at 236.
8 Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir. & Ira L. Brandriss, 
Staff Attorney, Div. of
Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n; Speech by 
SEC Staff: The Advantages of a Dual
System: Parallel Streams of Civil and Criminal 
Enforcement of the U.S. Securities
Laws, Address at the 16th International Symposium 
on Economic Crime (Sept. 19,
1998), http://www.sec.gov / n
e w s / sp e e c h / sp e e c h ar c h iv e / 19 9 8 / sp
c h 2 22
.
h t m
.
9 Id.
10 See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
11 See infra Part 1II; see also Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 235-36; 
Permian Corp. v.
United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
Diversified Indus., Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611-12 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) 
(Henley, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, 
Inc. (In re McKesson
HBOC, Inc.), No. 99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331, at *6-7 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005);
United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487, 495-96 
(N.D. Cal. 2003).
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announced it would not take action against a 
corporation whose sub-
sidiary, by way of acts of its controller, Gisela 
de Leon-Meredith,
"caused the parent company's books and records to be inaccurate and
its periodic reports misstated, and then covered 
up those facts."1 2 In
its discussion of how it decided not to take any 
action in this case, the
SEC listed thirteen factors it considers when 
deciding "whether, and
how much, to credit self-policing, self-reporting, 
remediation and
cooperation-from the extraordinary step 
of taking no enforcement
action to bringing reduced charges, seeking 
lighter sanctions, or
including mitigating language in documents 
we use to announce and
resolve enforcement actions. "1 The eleventh 
factor considered the
following questions:
Did the company promptly make available to 
our staff the
results of its review and provide sufficient documentation 
reflecting
its response to the situation? Did the company identify 
possible vio-
lative conduct and evidence with sufficient precision 
to facilitate
prompt enforcement actions against those who 
violated the law?
Did the company produce a thorough and probing 
written report
detailing the findings of its review? Did the company 
voluntarily
disclose information our staff did not directly request 
and otherwise
might not have uncovered? Did the company ask 
its employees to
cooperate with our staff and make all reasonable 
efforts to secure
such cooperation?
1 4
12 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 
21 (a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the 
Relationship of Cooperation to
Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act 
Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket
296, 296 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Report of Investigation], 
available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm. 
The SEC chooses to publish
Section 21(a) reports "where a question of public importance 
is involved and the
public, or at least the financial community, should 
be informed concerning the
nature of the situation and the Commission's 
response to it." In re Spartek Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 15,567, [1979 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,961 (Feb. 14, 1979), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-
44969.htm (Comm'r Loomis, concurring). "The SEC has 
issued Section 21(a)
reports with respect to novel or unique matters, 
or to express its views on matters
where it has decided not to institute enforcement 
proceedings." Ralph C. Ferrara &
Philip S. Khinda, Overview of an SEC Enforcement Proceeding, 1085 
PLI/Corp 597, 662
(1998) (citing In reW.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release 
No. 39,156, [1997 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,963 (Sept. 30, 
1997); Report Pursuant to
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding 
the NASD and the
Nasdaq Market, Exchange Act Release No. 37,542, 62 
SEC Docket 1375 (Aug. 8,
1996)).
13 Report of Investigation, supra note 12, at 
298; see id. at 298-99 (listing the
thirteen factors).
14 Id. at 299.
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In taking the "extraordinary step" of not taking action 
against the
parent company, 15 the SEC explained that
[t]he company pledged and gave complete cooperation to our staff.
It provided the staff with... the details of its internal 
investigation,
including notes and transcripts of interviews of Meredith 
and
others; and it did not invoke the attorney-client 
privilege, work product
protection or other privileges or protections with respect 
to any facts uncovered
in the investigation.' 6
While this was not all the company did to cooperate 
with the
SEC,' 7 it appears to be an important factor 
in the SEC's decision.
This release sends a clear message to corporations 
under informal
investigation by the SEC that waiving privileges 
can make the process
much easier and perhaps even prompt the SEC 
to drop the investiga-
tion completely.
B. The Department of Justice
The SEC is not alone in rewarding disclosure of 
privileged mater-
ials. The Department of Justice has gone so 
far as to announce an
official policy rewarding the waiver of attorney-client 
privilege and
work product protection.'
8  In his discussion of how prosecutors
should determine whether to charge a corporation 
with a crime, the
Deputy Attorney General listed several factors, 
one of which was
"It]he corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoings
and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation 
of its agents,
including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client 
and work
product privileges."19 He further explains that "granting 
a corporation
immunity or amnesty may be considered in the 
course of the govern-
ment's investigation."
20 The memorandum goes on to explain that
when the DOJ is working in conjunction with other agencies 
which
have "formal voluntary disclosure programs," 
like the SEC, it will
encourage corporations "as part of their compliance 
programs, to
conduct internal investigations and to disclose 
their findings" irre-
spective of whether those findings 
were originally privileged or not.
2 1
15 Id. at 298.
16 Id. at 296 (emphasis added).
17 See id. (noting that the company provided complete cooperation 
and strength-
ened its final reporting processes).
18 See Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney 
Gen. to All Component Heads
and U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against 
Corporations (June 16, 1999),
available at http://www.usdoj.go
v / c ri m in al / f ra u d / p oli c y / C h ar g in g
c o
r p s 'h t m l
.
19 Id. (emphasis added).
20 Id.
21 Id.
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Although the memorandum makes quite clear that voluntary disclo-
sure of privileged material can significantly benefit a corporation
under investigation, it also points out that this type of waiver is just
one factor of many a prosecutor may consider.22
C. The Issue: To Disclose or Not to Disclose
Although the perks of waiving privileges may be tempting, corpo-
rations should be wary of disclosing privileged materials to govern-
ment agencies. A corporation may escape formal investigation by the
SEC or obtain a more lenient settlement, but this may not make up
for the damage that could be caused by subsequent litigants who are
able to obtain the disclosed materials because they are no longer
privileged.
A corporation must make a decision about what is in its best inter-
ests, weighing the benefits and detriments of voluntarily disclosing
privileged material to the government. When faced with this decision,
corporations turn to their attorneys for advice. In order to provide
clients with the best service, attorneys must understand how the law
handles this situation. Because the case law in this area is, and has
been for a long time, inconsistent,2 - it is difficult for attorneys to accu-
rately predict how courts may view this type of voluntary disclosure in
future litigation. It is imperative that counsel is aware of the issues
that courts take into consideration when deciding whether corpora-
tions have waived their privileges and especially what courts in their
jurisdiction have decided on this issue. In circuits where there has
been no definite decision on this issue, attorneys face the challenge of
attempting to predict how district courts will analyze this problem
given the many different examples set by other circuits.
Not only do corporations and attorneys in undecided circuits face
uncertainty, but so do those in circuits which have adopted clear rules.
Due to the wide variance between the circuits on this issue, even cor-
porations and attorneys in circuits where a clear rule has been deline-
ated may be surprised by a change in the law in this area. All of this
uncertainty makes the decision of whether to disclose protected
materials to the government a difficult one; one that does not need to
be so difficult.
22 Id. ("The Department does not, however, consider waiver of a corporation's
privileges an absolute requirement, and prosecutors should consider the willingness
of a corporation to waive the privileges when necessary to provide timely and com-
plete information as only one factor in evaluating the corporation's cooperation.").
23 See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
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This Note will discuss the case law supporting 
the different
approaches that courts have taken when faced with 
these issues and
show why the approach crafted by the Second Circuit
24 and adopted
by a recent decision of the Northern District of 
California in the
Ninth Circuit 25 offers the best way to handle these 
difficult issues.
Part II of this Note will explain the basic rules governing 
attorney-
client privilege and work product protection. This 
Part will discuss
when these protections apply, how these protections can be 
waived,
and what policies these protections are meant to uphold. 
Part III will
discuss the current case law on this issue, providing 
examples of the
many different rules that circuits have created. Part 
IV analyzes the
case law coming from a district court in the Ninth 
Circuit,26 demon-
strating a recent shift in that court's approach 
to the issue. These
cases are particularly important as they are the most 
current attempt
to establish a rule governing this issue. Part V analyzes 
the different
methods described in Parts III and V and discusses 
the arguments
that the different circuits have used to support their 
holdings, points
out the flaws in many of the arguments and the strengths 
of others,
and explains why the rule expounded by the Second 
Circuit and by a
recent decision of the Northern District of California 
best upholds the
public policy behind both attorney-client privilege 
and work-product
protection.
II. EXPLANATION OF PRIVILEGE PROTECTIONS
A. Attorney-Client Privilege: Rule, Policy, and Waiver
Corporations, as well as individuals, enjoy the protections of the
attorney-client privilege.
27 It is the "oldest of the privileges for confi-
24 Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, 
L.P. (In re Steinhardt Part-
ners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
25 Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc. (In re McKesson 
HBOC, Inc.), No.
99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005).
26 Id.
27 United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 
236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915). How-
ever, the extent to which the privilege applies 
to corporations has been debated.
There are competing tests to determine whether 
employee communications to attor-
neys are considered privileged as a corporate communication. 
One test, called the
"control group test," provides that an employee's statement is only privileged 
if the
employee is "in a position to control or even to 
take a substantial part in a decision
about any action which the corporation may take 
upon the advice of the attorney, or
if he is an authorized member of a body or group 
which has that authority." City of
Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 
483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Another
provides that
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dential communications known to the common law."28 The protec-
tion is limited, however, to communication with attorneys,2 9 and
therefore offers more narrow protection than the work product doc-
trine may offer.30 The attorney-client privilege rule applies
only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to
become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3)
the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c)
for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law
or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and
an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is
sufficiently identified with the corporation ... where the employee makes
the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and
where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the
corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the
employee of the duties of his employment.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1970), affJd
by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). The Supreme Court explicitly rejected
the "control group test," reasoning that it "frustrates the very purpose of the privilege
by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the cli-
ent to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation." Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981). Instead the court adopted a "case-by-case"
approach. Id. at 396. It has been suggested that the Court here created six different
factors to consider when deciding if communications between employees and corpo-
rate counsel are privileged: (1) "the communication must be made by a corporate
employee upon an order of a corporate superior, and it must be necessary for the
corporation to secure legal advice"; (2) the information "must not be available to
upper level management"; (3) the communication "must concern matters within the
scope of the employee's corporate duties"; (4) "the employees must be aware that
their communication with counsel was for the purpose of rendering legal advice to
the corporation"; (5) "the communications must be ordered to remain confidential";
and (6) the "court may consider the identity and resources of the opposing party."
Rashelle C. Tanner, Adjudicator or Advocate? Attorneys' Responsibilities Under Sarbanes-
Oxley, FOR DEF., Jan. 2003, at 27, 29. Thus, attorneys may face further confusion in
determining whether certain communications are protected by attorney client privi-
lege at all as they attempt to apply this list of factors.
28 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
29 Id. at 395.
30 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (explaining that attorney work
product includes "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental
impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible" things).
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not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) 
the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
3 1
Accordingly, if a court determines that the 
attorney-client privi-
lege originally applied to communications or 
documents requested in
discovery, it must establish that the privilege 
has not been waived in
order to ensure that the materials or information 
still retain that privi-
lege.3 2 Waiver of attorney-client privilege occurs when there 
is disclo-
sure of the privileged material to a third 
party.3 3 However, waiver
does not occur where the disclosure is made 
in order to prepare a
joint or common defense.3 4 The issue of when waiver 
of attorney-cli-
ent privilege occurs has created disagreement 
between circuits and
confusion among corporations and their 
attorneys.
In determining what should constitute 
a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege, it is useful to examine the 
policy behind the privilege.
The Supreme Court stated that the privilege 
is meant to "encourage
full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients
and .... recognizes that sound legal advice 
or advocacy serves public
ends and that such advice. . . depends upon 
the lawyer's being fully
informed by the client."
3 5 If the purpose of the privilege is to ensure
that attorneys are fully informed and can 
provide adequate service to
their clients, continuing to allow the privilege 
to cover materials dis-
closed to the government does not serve this 
goal. This is because the
client in this situation has already disclosed 
the information to his
attorney and there is no further hindrance 
to the attorney's ability to
represent his client once they have decided 
to disclose the materials
to the government.
3 6
B. Work Product Protection: Rule, Policy, and 
Waiver
Corporations can also attempt to shield 
internal investigations
and other documents from discovery by invoking 
the protection of the
31 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 
89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950). The Eighth Circuit applied this rule from this "frequently 
cited case." Diversi-
fied Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601 
(8th Cir. 1977) (panel).
32 See, e.g., United Shoe Mach., 89 F. Supp. at 
358-59.
33 In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[S]ubsequent 
disclosure to a
third party by the party of a communication 
with his attorney eliminates whatever
privilege the communication may have originally 
possessed, whether because disclo-
sure is viewed as an indication that confidentiality 
is no longer intended or as a waiver
of the privilege.").
34 See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 
237, 243-45 (2d Cir. 1989); United
States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336-37 (7th Cir. 1979).
35 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
36 See infra Part V for further discussion of this issue.
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work product doctrine. The work product doctrine can potentially
protect more than the attorney-client privilege because it is not lim-
ited only to communications between clients and attorneys.3 7 The
work product doctrine protects "written statements, private memo-
randa and personal recollections, '38 often called attorney work prod-
uct, from discovery when prepared for or by an attorney in
anticipation of litigation. 39
Similar to attorney-client privilege, work product protection can
be waived. As a general rule, waiver of work product protection
occurs when a party shares protected material with an adversary. 40
This waiver rule varies from the rule governing attorney-client privi-
lege in that it is specific to disclosure of the material to an adversary.
Work product protection is waived when "disclosure is inconsistent
with maintaining secrecy from possible adversaries. '41 Therefore,
attorney-client privilege will generally be waived when protected mate-
rial is disclosed to any third person, but to show waiver of work prod-
uct protection, that third person must be at least a potential
adversary. 42 Additionally, the different policies each doctrine is
meant to foster can affect whether a protection has been waived; if
37 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
38 Id. at 510. This rule is now codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b) (3), which provides:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b) (1) of this rule and prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or far that other
party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemni-
tor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case
and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning
the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
39 See, e.g., Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289,
304 (6th Cir. 2002). Work product protection does not apply, however, to documents
addressing business, rather than legal, issues prepared by counsel. See In re Kidder
Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 462-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec.
Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
40 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S, 225, 239 (1975).
41 Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
42 See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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disclosure undermines the policy that originally protected the mate-
rial, it is more likely that a court will consider the protection waived. 43
The policy concerns underlying the work product doctrine differ
from those of the attorney-client privilege. Work product protection
ensures that an attorney may serve his client effectively without worry-
ing that his work will later be discoverable in court.44 The Supreme
Court stated that without protection for attorney work product "much
of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attor-
ney's thoughts... would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and
sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice
and in the preparation of cases for trial." 45 Additionally, the doctrine
ensures that discovery serves its intended purpose of bringing the facts
of the case to light and does not enable lawyers to piggyback on the
work of opposing counsel.46
As a result, whether attorney-client privilege or work product pro-
tection applies to the materials in question will affect how a court
decides whether or not a corporation has waived its protection.
III. PRIVILEGE WAIVER CASE LAw: THE MANY APPROACHES TO WAIVER
While the rules and policies behind attorney-client privilege and
work product protection may seem clear, courts have not applied
them consistently. In cases where a party has previously disclosed pro-
tected material to a government agency, such as the SEC, courts have
not agreed whether subsequent litigants have a right to discovery of
the once-protected materials. 47 Some courts have created bright line
rules, others are more flexible. 48 Those applying bright line rules are
43 C.f. McMorgan & Co. v. First Cal. Mortgage Co., 931 F. Supp. 703, 709 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (explaining that due to the differing policies underlying the two forms of
privilege, attorney-client privilege does not apply when the materials were never
intended to be kept confidential, but attorney work product protection is not necessa-
rily waived in this situation).
44 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947).
45 Id. at 511.
46 Id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring) (reasoning that "(dliscovery was hardly
intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits
or on wits borrowed from the adversary").
47 Compare Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (holding that disclosure to the government does not waive attorney-client
privilege), with Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289,
306-07 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that disclosure to the government waives both attor-
ney-client privilege and work product protection).
48 Compare Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611 (disclosure to the government never waives
attorney-client privilege), with Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners,
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in conflict: One court holds that disclosure to a government 
agency of
materials protected by attorney-client privilege never 
waives that privi-
lege as to other parties,
49 while another court says that in such a situa-
tion attorney-client privilege is always waived.
0 Similar disparities
exist in the law applying to materials once 
protected as work
product.51
Courts that do not agree with such rules consider 
such things as
whether the party and the government agency 
entered into a confi-
dentiality agreement. In Salmon Brothers Treasury 
Litigation v. Stein-
hardt Partners, L.P. (In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.),
52 the Second Circuit
declined to adopt a bright line rule of waiver, 
acknowledging that in
some circumstances, such as when a confidentiality 
agreement has
been negotiated, waiver may not be 
appropriate.5 3
Because the Supreme Court has not determined 
what law should
apply in cases like this, the courts of appeal have 
discretion to choose
which methods suit them. However, not all 
circuits have taken a
stance on the issue, leaving district courts and attorneys 
in their juris-
dictions with little guidance. In this circumstance, 
district courts must
look to what other circuits have done and determine 
which route is
most persuasive. Attorneys must try to predict what 
districts courts will
decide when faced with this issue as they advise their 
clients about the
decision to disclose privileged material to government 
agencies.
L.P. (In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (disclosure to the
government may waive work product protection 
depending on the circumstances of
the waiver).
49 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
50 Tenn. Laborers, 293 F.3d at 303-04.
51 Compare id. at 306-07 (work product protection is always 
waived when there is
disclosure to an adversary), with Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 236 
(work product protection
may not necessarily be waived where the parties signed 
a confidentiality agreement or
where the parties share a common interest).
52 9 F.3d 230.
53 Id. at 236.
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A. Limited Waiver Doctrine
.54 The Eighth's Circuit's Approach
to Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
In 1977, the Eighth Circuit established an exception 
to the waiver
provision of the attorney-client privilege doctrine
.55 The exception
allowed a corporation to retain its attorney-client 
privilege over docu-
ments even if they were voluntarily turned over to 
the SEC. The court
described this act as a "limited waiver" of 
the attorney-client
privilege .56
Diversified Industries appealed to the Eighth Circuit 
after the dis-
trict court denied protection under the attorney-client 
privilege and
the work product doctrine of several documents 
prepared by Diversi-
fied's attorneys. Diversified had been involved 
in proxy fight litigation
when it came to light that Diversified may have 
been engaging in an
unlawful conspiracy as well as violating antitrust 
laws. The proxy fight
litigation settled, and Diversified later hired 
a law firm to conduct an
internal investigation of its business 
practices. 57
As a result of the proxy fight litigation, the 
SEC began its own
investigation of Diversified.
58 In the course of its investigation, the
SEC issued a subpoena demanding 
the documents in question.
59
Diversified voluntarily produced the documents 
to the SEC.60
In a second round of litigation, Diversified's contracted 
partner,
Weatherhead Company, sought discovery of the 
material handed over
to the SEC. 61 Diversified argued that the documents 
were protected
by the attorney-client privilege and the work product 
doctrine.62 The
three-judge panel that first heard the case rejected Diversified's 
work
product argument, concluding that the documents 
were not prepared
in anticipation of litigation because the documents 
were prepared in
the regular course of business for the purpose 
of informing the corpo-
ration about the situation and how to avoid the 
same problems in the
54 The doctrine is also referred to as "selective 
waiver" by many courts. See, e.g.,
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 
951 F.2d 1414, 1423 & n.7 (3d Cir.
1991); id. at 1423 n.7 ("Although the rule in Diversified is 
often referred to as the
'limited waiver rule,' we prefer not to use that 
phrase because the word 'limited'
refers to two distinct types of waivers: selective 
and partial.").
55 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 
F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 599-600 (panel).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 611 (en banc).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 600 (panel).
62 Id. at 599.
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future.6 3 On hearing the case en banc, 
the court decided that the
report prepared by Diversified's attorneys, 
including employee inter-
views, were entitled to the attorney-client 
privilege, but other docu-
ments Weatherhead sought in discovery 
were not entitled to the same
privilege.64 The more difficult issue for 
the court was whether Diversi-
fied had waived its attorney-client privilege 
with respect to the report
when it voluntarily turned it over to the 
SEC. The court decided that
although the traditional waiver rule seemed 
to dictate that any volun-
tary production of protected material 
waived the privilege, in this case
the waiver was only limited and therefore 
Weatherhead was not enti-
tled to discovery of the report or 
any parts thereof.
65 The court
explained that "[lt] o hold otherwise may have 
the effect of thwarting
the developing procedure of corporations 
to employ independent
outside counsel to investigate and 
advise them in order to protect
stockholders, potential stockholders 
and customers
-
.
66
Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that when 
the attorney-client privi-
lege applies, voluntary production 
of the privileged material to the
SEC does not categorically waive that 
privilege in the future.
6 7 This is
true where, as here, the parties have 
not even entered into a confiden-
tiality agreement with the SEC. However, 
because work product pro-
tection never applied to the materials sought 
in Diversified Industries,
Inc. v. Meredith,
68 this holding cannot be seen to extend 
the principle
of limited waiver to materials once protected 
as work product. Since
1977, the Eighth Circuit has not overruled 
the limited waiver doc-
63 Id. at 603-04.
64 Id. at 610-11 (en banc).
65 Id. at 611. In its decision that only a limited waiver 
occurred, the court cited
Bucks County Bank & Trust Co. v. Storck, 297 F. 
Supp. 1122, 1123-24 (D. Haw. 1969)
(holding that testimony from a suppression hearing cannot 
be admitted in a subse-
quent criminal trial) and United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 
259 (4th Cir. 1961),
vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961) (concluding 
that defendants can invoke
the Fifth Amendment privilege in a subsequent 
investigation unless prosecution is
barred by statute of limitations). Diversified, 572 F.2d at 
611 (en banc).
66 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 604 (panel).
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trine.69 However, other circuits have explicitly denounced the
doctrine. 70
B. Rejection of Limited Waiver Doctrine: Absolute
Waiver of Both Protections
Courts applying this line of reasoning hold that any voluntary dis-
closure to a third party waives attorney-client privilege as to all others,
and if that third party is an adversary, then work product protection is
also waived. 7' Some consider this, the majority approach, pointing to
decisions from the Second, Third, and D.C. Circuits. 72 However,
while the approach from these circuits does reject limited waiver of
attorney-client privilege, there does not seem to be a true majority
approach to waiver of work product protection.
In Tennessee Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices
Litigation),73 the Sixth Circuit adopted the opposite rule regarding
waiver than that espoused by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified. Tennes-
see Laborers illustrates the rule that disclosure to a third-party adversary
waives not only attorney-client privilege, but also work product protec-
tion.74 Tennessee Laborers involved the discovery of documents the
defendant, Columbia/HCA, claimed were covered by both attorney-
client privilege and work product protection.75 Columbia/HCA had
previously disclosed the documents to the DOJ and other government
agencies when it was under investigation for alleged Medicare and
69 But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings Subpoena, 841 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir.
1988) (questioning Diversified's holding, arguing that "disclosure is inconsistent with
the confidential attorney-client relationship and waives the privilege" and that "'(a]
claim that a need for confidentiality must be respected in order to facilitate the seek-
ing and rendering of informed legal service is not consistent with selective disclosure
when the claimant decides that the confidential materials can be put to other benefi-
cial purposes'" (quotingjohn Doe Corp. v. United States (In reJohn Doe Corp.), 675
F.2d 482, 484 (2d Cir. 1982))).
70 See, e.g., Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289,
304 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685-86 (1st
Cir. 1997); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
71 Tenn. Laborers, 293 F.3d at 304-06.
72 See, e.g., Alec Koch, Note, Internal Corporate investigations: The Waiver of Attorney-
Client Privilege and Work-Product Protection Through Voluntary Disclosures to the Government,
34 AM. CraM. L. REv. 347, 358-59 (1997).
73 293 F.3d 289.
74 Id. at 304-06.
75 Id. at 292.
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Medicaid fraud.76 Under the disclosure agreement, 
the DOJ agreed
to maintain the confidentiality of the documents.
77 Subsequently, pri-
vate parties filed lawsuits stemming from the activities 
the DOJ had
investigated. 7 Not surprisingly, these parties requested 
discovery of
the materials disclosed to the DOJ.
79
Columbia defended its refusal to produce the 
documents by
arguing that it had not waived its privileges, citing 
the holding in
Diversified.80 It also argued that the agreement it made with the 
DOJ
preserved the confidentiality of the documents as 
to the plaintiffs, as
they were not government entities."'
, The plaintiffs did not argue that
the documents were not originally protected by 
attorney-client privi-
lege or work product protection; thus, the court 
proceeded on the
assumption that the documents were privileged under 
both doctrines
and focused its analysis on whether the disclosure 
to the DOJ had
waived these privileges.
82
The court first turned to waiver of attorney-client 
privilege. After
examining the selective waiver doctrine, the court 
rejected it "in any
of its various forms."8 3 The court reasoned that the 
doctrine has "lit-
tle, if any, relation to fostering frank communication 
between a client
and his or her attorney."
84 It argued the selective waiver doctrine
"transforms the attorney-client privilege into 'merely 
another brush
on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated 
to gain tactical or
strategic advantage.' "85 Further, it stated that "attorney-client 
privi-
lege is a matter of common law right" and is "not 
a creature of con-
76 Id. at 291.
77 Id. at 292. The terms of the confidentiality 
agreement were as follows:
"[T]he disclosure of any report, document, or information 
by one party to
the other does not constitute a waiver of any applicable 
privilege or claim
under the work product doctrine. Both parties to 
the agreement reserve the
right to contest the assertion of any privilege by the 
other party to the agree-
ment, but will not argue that the disclosing party, 
by virtue of the disclosures
it makes pursuant to this agreement, has waived any 
applicable privilege or
work product doctrine claim."
Id. (quoting the confidentiality agreement between Columbia/HCA 
and the DOJ).
This confidentiality agreement, however, allowed 
the DOJ to disclose the information
to other government agencies and congressional 
committees. See id. at 292 n.2.
78 Id. at 292.
79 Id. at 293.
80 Id. (citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 
596 (8th Cir. 1978)).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 294.
83 Id. at 302.
84 Id.
85 Id. (quoting Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt 
Partners, L.P. (In re
Steinhardt Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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tract, arranged between parties to suit the whim 
of the moment."8 6 It
also rejected Diversifiedas reasoning that selective waiver 
would assist in
the "truth finding process" by providing incentives 
to disclose privi-
leged materials to the government by pointing 
out that private liti-
gants are just as important a part of finding the truth 
as the
government may be.
8 7 Finally, the court noted that defendants are
never forced to waive their attorney-client privilege, 
but rather choose
to do so after weighing the benefits of disclosure 
against the detri-
ments. Thus, the court found no legitimate 
reason, given the policies
underlying attorney-client privilege, to support 
the doctrine of selec-
tive waiver.88
The court then turned to the issue of work 
product protection
waiver. It first noted that attorney-client privilege 
waiver laws are not
the same as those governing waiver of work 
product protection, and
therefore it did not follow from its conclusion 
that attorney-client priv-
ilege had been waived that work production 
protection was also
waived.8 9 Thus, when faced with a defendant 
claiming protection
under both doctrines, the court must analyze 
each separately to deter-
mine whether there has been waiver.
90 However, this court stated that
the only difference between the two was that 
in order to waive work
product protection, the disclosure must be 
made to an adversary, not
just any third party, as is the case in attorney-client privilege 
waiver.9 I
In support of this conclusion, the court stated, 
"It]he ability to pre-
pare one's case in confidence, which is the 
chief reason articulated in
Hickman for the work product protection[ ], has little 
to do with talk-
ing to the Government."
92 Additionally, the court argued that the
waiver of work product protection, like the 
waiver of attorney-client
privilege, is a strategic choice.
93 The court did not analyze the effect
of the confidentiality agreement.
As a result of this case, the prevailing law 
in the Sixth Circuit dic-
tates that when a defendant has previously 
disclosed protected materi-
als to a government agency that is the 
defendant's adversary, the
defendant waives both its attorney-client 
privilege and its work prod-
86 Id. at 303.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 304.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 306.
92 Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
93 Id. at 306-07.
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uct protection.94 The result does not depend on whether the parties
entered into a confidentiality agreement.
C. Case-by-Case Waiver Analysis: The Second Circuit's Compromise
The Second Circuit adopted a more flexible rule regarding
waiver of work product protection that will require future courts to
analyze each situation on a case-by-case basis. In Salmon Brothers,
plaintiffs requested a memorandum that Steinhardt Partners previ-
ously disclosed to the SEC in a separate investigation. 95 The SEC had
requested the memorandum as part of an investigation into possible
wrongdoings in the market for Treasury notes. Steinhardt agreed to
share the memorandum with the SEC but did not enter into a confi-
dentiality agreement with the SEC. When civil litigants later
requested discovery of this memorandum, Steinhardt claimed that it
was protected under the work product doctrine.96 Thus, the court
faced the issue of whether the voluntary disclosure of the memoran-
dum to the SEC, once protected by the work product doctrine, waived
that protection as to subsequent civil litigants. 97
In its analysis, the court acknowledged that the district courts in
the Second Circuit had come to different conclusions when faced with
this issue. 98 The district court below had found that the SEC was an
adversary to Steinhardt and that Steinhardt had voluntarily disclosed
the memorandum to the SEC.99 Thus, the district court held that, as a
matter of law, Steinhardt had waived its work product protection over
the memorandum. 100 The Second Circuit agreed that the SEC was an
adversary because "Steinhardt knew that it was the subject of an SEC
investigation, and that the memorandum was sought as a part of this
investigation."1 ' Additionally, the court agreed that the disclosure
was voluntary and "therefore distinguishable from situations in which
94 Id. at 304-06.
95 9 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1993).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 232-33.
98 Id. at 233 (citing Enron Corp. v. Borget, No. 88 Civ. 2828 (DNE), 1990 WL
144879, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1990) (waiver of work product protection); Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (disclosure to SEC waived attorney-client privilege); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust,
85 F.R.D. 679, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying Eighth Circuit law and holding attor-
ney-client privilege not waived); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46,
52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no waiver of work product protection)).
99 Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 234.
100 Id,
101 Id.
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disclosure to an adversary is only obtained through 
compulsory legal
process." 10 2 However, the court of appeals disagreed 
with the district
court's decision that these two conclusions necessarily 
led to a waiver
of work product protection as a matter of law.'"
3 After examining the
purpose of work product protection, "that opposing 
counsel should
not enjoy free access to an attorney's thought processes, 
"
1 0 4 the court
of appeals held that, in this particular case, Steinhardt 
did waive its
work product protection.
05 But in so holding, the court declined "to
adopt a per se rule that all voluntary disclosures 
to the government
waive work product protection."
1 0 6 The court explained that doing so
would fail to anticipate situations in which the disclosing 
party and
the government may share a common interest in 
developing legal
theories and analyzing information, or situations in 
which the SEC
and the disclosing party have entered into an explicit 
agreement
that the SEC will maintain the confidentiality of 
the disclosed
materials.107
This rationale implies that a corporation will retain 
work product
protection over materials disclosed to the 
SEC if it either shares a
common interest with the SEC or if it enters 
into a confidentiality
agreement with the SEC. However, if the corporation 
shares a com-
mon interest with the SEC, the SEC is probably 
not an adversary of the
corporation. It is only when a party discloses 
work product to an
adversary that the protection may be waived.
108 Courts have routinely
held that the SEC is an adversary even when 
it is not conducting a
formal investigation or when it has not filed any 
charges against a cor-
poration on the theory that the SEC has the option 
of doing so in the
future.10 9
102 Id.
103 Id. at 236.
104 Id. at 234 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 
511 (1947)).
105 Id. at 235.
106 Id. at 236.
107 Id.
108 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 
(1975).
109 See, e.g., Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 234. However, 
an interesting dilemma may
arise when the corporation believes, correctly 
or not, that the SEC is requesting the
documents as part of an investigation of a third 
party. If the SEC later uses those
documents against the disclosing corporation, 
the SEC is clearly an adversary at that
point. But the SEC may not have been an adversary 
at the time of disclosure. In
situations like this, it is possible for courts to 
allow the corporation to retain its work
product protection, either on the basis that the 
SEC was not an adversary at the time
of disclosure or by arguing that even though the 
SEC is an adversary, the corporation
had a common interest with the SEC at the time 
of disclosure. This is another issue
that has yet to be resolved.
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Thus, for all practical purposes, if the SEC is investigating 
a cor-
poration for possible violations of the securities laws, 
the only way a
corporation may be able to retain work product 
protection over
materials it voluntarily discloses to the SEC, at least 
in the Second Cir-
cuit, is to enter into an agreement whereby the SEC 
must keep the
disclosed materials confidential.
110
For corporations in this jurisdiction, a confidentiality agreement
protects from waiver of work product protection 
because disclosure
has not violated the policy underlying such protection. 
Work product
protection is meant to ensure that an attorney 
can work efficiently
and effectively without fear that opposing counsel 
will be able to use
his work against him."
1 Because disclosure combined with a confi-
dentiality agreement is not "inconsistent with 
maintaining secrecy
from possible adversaries," work product protection 
should not be
waived as to future adversaries.
1 1 2
Although the issue of attorney-client privilege 
waiver did not
come up before the court in Salmon Brothers, the court 
did address the
issue in its discussion in dictum. 
13 The court agreed with the analysis
of the D.C. Circuit in Permian Corp. v. United States,
I 14 which rejected
the selective waiver theory adopted by the Eighth 
Circuit in Diversi-
fied. 115 The court reasoned that waiver upon voluntary 
disclosure to
the government does not harm the attorney-client 
relationship and
that "selective assertion of privilege should not 
be merely another
brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated 
to gain tacti-
cal or strategic advantage."
' 16 A corporation presumably gets some-
thing in return for disclosing privileged material 
to the SEC, and it
must therefore weigh that benefit against the detriment 
it might incur
in later litigation when deciding whether it will disclose 
the privileged
material or keep it confidential. 
17 The Second Circuit did not indi-
110 But see Richard M. Strassberg & Sarah 
E. Walters, Is Selective Waiver of Pivilege
Viable?, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 2003, at 7 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley's 
requirement of
"inquiry into allegations of wrongdoing and 
the government's heightened efforts to
require counsel to assist their investigations-in 
effect deputizing counsel to act as
private prosecutors--may have the effect of 
bringing the interests of the company and
the government more in line, and revitalizing 
this line of argument for selective
waiver").
111 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
112 Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & 
Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
113 Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 235.
114 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
115 Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 235.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 235-36.
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cate that any exception should be made when 
a corporation enters
into a confidentiality agreement with the government 
when disclosing
materials protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
Thus, a corpora-
tion may be able to shield from discovery materials 
protected under
the work product doctrine, but not under attorney-client 
privilege, by
negotiating for confidentiality.
The SEC submitted an amicus brief arguing against 
the selective
waiver doctrine in this case.ltI The SEC convinced 
the court that the
selective waiver theory was not necessary in 
order for corporations to
continue to cooperate with investigations through 
disclosure of mater-
ials covered by the attorney-client privilege.
1 19 The SEC stated that
despite rejection of selective waiver in many jurisdictions, 
corpora-
tions were still complying with requests to disclose 
protected materi-
als.120 Apparently, the benefits of disclosure to 
the SEC outweigh the
detriments of privilege waiver.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT: AN EXAMPLE OF 
SHIFTING
PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVILEGE WAIVER
Recently, a district court in the Ninth Circuit 
shifted its perspec-
tive on the issue of waiver. In the space of two years, 
this court moved
from applying a rule which provided for an absolute 
waiver of work
product protection upon disclosure to an 
adversary' 2 ' to a rule
allowing for retention of work product protection 
where the disclo-
sure was accompanied by a confidentiality agreement.
1 22 The case law
does not yet provide a satisfying conclusion 
to the issue, but recent
changes in district court reasoning may 
provide some guidance.
These decisions point attorneys in the direction 
of law like that of the
Second Circuit as exemplified in Salmon Brothers.
A. United States v. Bergonzi1
23 : The Old Approach
In 2003, the Northern District of California applied 
similar rules
to those applied in the Sixth Circuit's decision 
in Tennessee Laborers.
United States v. Bergonzi involved a situation in which 
former executives
of HBO & Company were indicted for securities, 
mail and wire fraud
following the discovery of accounting irregularities 
by McKesson, a
118 Id. at 236.
119 See id.
120 Id.
121 See United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 
487, 498 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
122 See Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc. 
(In re McKesson HBOC, Inc.), No.
99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
31, 2005).
123 216 F.R.D. 487.
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company that had recently acquired HBO.12 4 McKesson, through its
attorneys, entered into a confidentiality agreement with the SEC
agreeing to provide the internal investigation report that it was pre-
paring while investigating these irregularities. The agreement pro-
vided that McKesson did not waive its work product or attorney-client
privileges in regard to the disclosed material.1 2-5 It further provided
that the SEC would keep the information confidential "'except to the
extent that the [SEC] determines that disclosure is otherwise required
by federal law." 126 Subsequently, McKesson entered into a similar
agreement with the United States Attorney's Office (USAO).127
McKesson later discovered that the USAO had inadvertently provided
some of the materials covered by its confidentiality agreement to the
former executive defendants of HBO facing the securities, mail, and
wire fraud charges. 128 McKesson requested the return of the docu-
ments from the executive defendants, and only one of them complied
with this request.' 29 As a result, the court faced the issue of whether
the noncomplying defendant had to return the documents as a result
of attorney-client or work product privileges.' 30
The court first turned to the issue of attorney-client privilege.' 3'
The court stated that "communications between client and attorney
for the purpose of relaying communication to a third party [are] not
confidential and not protected by the attorney-client privilege."13 2
Thus, because the documents in question were prepared after McKes-
son agreed to disclose them to the government, they were never cov-
ered by attorney-client privilege.' 33
Next the court turned to the application of work product protec-
tion. 13 4 First, the court distinguished the applicability of attorney-cli-
ent privilege from that of work product protection by pointing out
that there was no similar requirement for work product protection
that the materials are not created with the intent to disclose them to a
124 Id. at 490.
125 Id. at 491.
126 Id. (quoting the confidentiality agreement between McKesson HBOC and the
SEC).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 491-92.
130 Id. at 492.
131 Id. at 493-94.
132 Id. at 493 (citing United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1204-05 (C.D.
Cal. 1999)).
133 Id. at 494.
134 Id. at 494-98.
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third party. -3 5 Thus, because the materials in question were prepared
in anticipation of litigation, the court held that work product protec-
tion applied originally. 136
Finally, the court had to determine whether McKesson had
waived its work product protection, McKesson argued that it did not
waive its work product protection because it shared a common inter-
est with the USAO. 137 The court rejected McKesson's common inter-
est argument, reasoning that
the "common interest" alleged is not like the interest shared by
allied lawyers and clients who are working together in prosecuting
or defending a lawsuit. "Indeed, the Company and the Government
did not have a true common goal, as it could not have been the
Company's goal to impose liability onto itself, a consideration
always maintained by the government.138
It further rejected the argument that the confidentiality agree-
ment demonstrated a common interest, noting that the "agreement
made by the Government to keep the documents was not uncondi-
tional"'139 because it provided for an exception where disclosure was
required by law. 140 The court then held that McKesson waived its
work product protection over the material in question because
"[o]nce a party has disclosed work product to one adversary, it waives
work product protection as to all other adversaries."' 4'
The court's reasoning in this case is similar to that of the Sixth
Circuit's in Tennessee Laborers, in that it held that work product protec-
tion is waived whenever there is disclosure to a third-party adversary,
despite the existence of a confidentiality agreement. However, the
court does seem to indicate that if the confidentiality agreement did
not include an exception allowing the government to disclose the doc-
uments if "otherwise required by federal law,'"142 it would have ruled
differently on this issue.1 43 This point does not provide much assis-
tance to corporations or their counsel, as the government is hardly
likely to agree to confidentiality when federal law requires disclosure.
Even if the government did sign an agreement purporting to do such
135 Id. at 494 (citing McMorgan & Co. v. First Cal. Mortgage Co., 931 F. Supp. 703,
709 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
136 Id. at 495.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 496 (citing McMorgan, 931 F. Supp. at 703).
139 Id. at 496-97.
140 Id. at 491.
141 Id. at 498.
142 Id. at 491.
143 Id. at 494.
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a thing, it would not be enforceable if, in fact, federal 
law did require
disclosure. Thus, this court's decision, for all practical 
purposes, does
not distinguish between cases where the corporation 
has entered into
a confidentiality agreement with the government 
and those cases
where no such agreement was made.
B. Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc. (In re McKesson
HBOC, Inc.)144 : The New Approach
Although only a district court decision, Aronson 
v. McKesson
HBOC, Inc. (In re McKesson HBOC, Inc.) indicates a surprising 
change
in jurisprudence in this area. Despite its own previous decision 
on
this issue in Bergonzi following precedent from the 
Sixth Circuit deci-
sion in Tennessee Laborers, the District Court for 
the Northern District
of California applied principles from the Second 
Circuit decision in
Salmon Brothers when it faced the issue of waiver 
for the second
time.1 4
5
In McKesson, plaintiff shareholders sought discovery 
of the same
report and other materials prepared by McKesson's 
attorneys that
were disputed in Bergonzi.
146 McKesson refused to comply with the
discovery request, claiming protection under attorney-client 
privilege
and work product protection.
147 The court thus faced the same issue
of whether either or both of the privileges were 
waived upon disclo-
sure to the SEC and the USAO.
The court first addressed the issue of attorney-client 
privilege.
Attorney-client privilege does not apply to material 
that was never
intended to be kept confidentia
l .
'
48 McKesson agreed to disclose the
report and other materials to the SEC and USAO 
before the report
was prepared.149 Thus, the court held that this privilege 
never applied
to the materials in the first place, and there was 
no need to discuss
whether the privilege was waived by voluntary disclosure.
150 This deci-
144 No. 99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
31, 2005).
145 Id. at *10; see Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 498 (holding that 
"[oince a party has
disclosed work product to one adversary, it waives 
work product protection as to all
other adversaries" with no exceptions). Interestingly, in both 
of these cases the party
attempting to assert privilege over the materials in 
question was McKesson HBOC. See
McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *1; Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 
at 490.
146 McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *1.
147 Id.
148 Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 
447 (2d Cir. 1958)).
149 Id. at *1 n.3.
150 Id. at *5.
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sion by the court followed the same reasoning that it applied in
Bergonzi. 15 1
There was no dispute regarding the application of work product
protection to the report and other materials, so the court focused on
the issue of waiver of this protection. 52 The court first concluded
that the government agencies were adversaries for the purpose of
waiver due to the "potential for dispute and even litigation."' 53 Fur-
ther, although McKesson professed an interest in "pinpointing the
source of the alleged accounting misdeeds," it did not share a "suffi-
ciently aligned" common interest with the government to make this
exception to the waiver doctrine apply to this case. 154 Under the deci-
sion in Bergonzi, these conclusions on their own would be enough to
deny McKesson's work product protection. 155
But the McKesson court continued its analysis of the waiver issue.
The court next examined whether the disclosure increased McKes-
son's adversaries' access to the report and back-up materials. 15 6 The
court reasoned that it could allow work product protection to stand in
this case without adopting the limited waiver doctrine of Diversified.157
It noted that several courts have left open the issue of whether a confi-
dentiality agreement covering disclosed materials serves to keep work
151 United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487, 493-94 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
152 McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *5-6.
153 Id. at *6 (quoting United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st
Cir. 1997)).
154 Id. at *7.
155 Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 495-98.
156 McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *7-10.
157 Id. at *8. The court discusses the SEC's similar view, asserted in its amicus brief
to the court:
[T] he SEC asserts that finding no waiver of work product protection pursu-
ant to a confidentiality agreement with the government need not be con-
strued as endorsement of the selective waiver doctrine because these cases
have recognized while rejecting the selective waiver doctrine, that disclosure
to the government pursuant to a confidentiality agreement can preserve
work product protection.
Id. at *8 n.11 (citing Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, McKesson, No. 99-CV-20793,
2005 WL 934331). Compare this to the SEC's position in Salmon Brothers, supporting
the rejection of the selective waiver doctrine because corporations did not need such
protection in order to have motivation to disclose materials protected by attorney-
client privilege with the SEC. Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, L.P.
(In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993). Does this imply that
the SEC believes that there is no such incentive for documents covered by work prod-
uct protection?
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product protection intact.15 8 The court then explicitly rejected the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Tennessee Laborers that work product protec-
tion was waived even if the parties had agreed to confidentiality.' 5 9
Following the reasoning of Judge Boggs's dissenting opinion in Ten-
nessee Laborers, the court agreed that "the principles of waiver
should . . .accommodate a public policy recognizing the need for
cooperation with the government where such cooperation does not
distort the adversarial relationship protected by the work product doc-
trine."1 60 Thus, when disclosing protected material to the govern-
ment under a confidentiality agreement, the court held that work
product protection will not be waived. 161 The confidentiality agree-
ment ensures that the disclosure does not undermine the policy
underlying work product protection.
Applying this to the case at bar, the court determined that McKes-
son did not waive its work product protection. 162 The court took "into
consideration the benefit to the public of permitting disclosure of
work product to the government and.. . the cases... rejecting selec-
tive waiver but endorsing the preservation of work product protection
under 'negotiated confidentiality with the government." 16 3 Thus, in
the span of just two years, facing nearly the same set of facts, the
Northern District of California shifted its position considerably,
allowing work product protection to stand as a result of the confiden-
tiality agreement between McKesson and the government.
158 McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *8 ("'[E]stablishing a rigid rule (that disclosure
to the government waives work product protection] would fail to anticipate situations
in which the disclosing party and the government may share a common interest in
developing legal theories and analyzing information, or situations in which the SEC
and the disclosing party have entered into an explicit agreement that the SEC will
maintain the confidentiality of the disclosed materials."' (alternations in original)
(quoting Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 236)); id. (citing Permian Corp. v. United States, 665
F.2d 1214, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that work product is preserved when par-
ties agree to confidentiality before disclosure); In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738
F.2d 1367, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that work product protection is preserved
for internal reports when not disclosed or when there is a confidentiality agreement
before disclosure).
159 McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *8-9.
160 Id. at *9 (citing Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.),
293 F.3d 289, 311 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting)).
161 Id. Disclosure to a nongovernment entity yields the opposite result. Id.
162 Id. at *10.
163 Id.
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V. ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW: WHY THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA TOOK THE BEST APPROACH
Until the Supreme Court decides these issues, each circuit is on
its own to determine which of these approaches it will take, or if it will
choose to create a new approach. When examining the reasoning of
these different courts, it becomes clear that some approaches have
more support than others.
A. Should Courts Apply the Limited Waiver Doctrine?
The Eighth Circuit in Diversified did not give much legal support
for its decision that attorney-client privilege was not waived upon dis-
closure to the government. In its creation of the limited waiver doc-
trine, the court simply cited two cases with no discussion of their
relevance.16 4 The first case the court cited, Bucks County Bank & Trust
Co. v. Storck,165 held that testimony from a hearing on a motion to
return property obtained in an illegal search and seizure did not waive
attorney-client privilege as to the information in the testimony and
therefore could not be used against a defendant in a criminal case.' 66
The second case the court cited, United States v. Goodman,167 discussed
waiver of Fifth Amendment privileges in a subsequent criminal investi-
gation when there has been prior disclosure to investigating
officials. 168
These two cases do not mandate the conclusion in Diversified.
There are different policy considerations underlying the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege than those of attorney-client privilege, The Fifth
Amendment exists to protect an "individual from compulsory incrimi-
nation through his own testimony or personal records."1 6  This policy
is unrelated to that of the attorney-client privilege, which is to foster
communication between attorney and client. 170 Additionally, two
completely different sets of rules govern procedure in federal civil and
criminal cases. Further, the rules regarding admissibility of evidence
in a criminal case may differ from the rules regarding admissibility in
164 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).
165 297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1969).
166 Id. at 1123.
167 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1961), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961).
168 Id. at 259.
169 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974) (quoting United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944)).
170 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
1337
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
civil cases.171 Thus, the Eighth Circuit cites to no precedent that man-
dates its conclusion in Diversified.
The court instead relied, for the most part, on the policy argu-
ment that not creating such a doctrine would "thwart[ ] the develop-
ing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside
counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockhold-
ers, potential stockholders and customers." 72 In 1977, when the
court wrote this decision, this policy argument may have been persua-
sive, but in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley's regulations relating to inde-
pendent audit committees, 73 this argument simply does not hold
much weight. Sarbanes-Oxley set up rules for independent audit com-
mittees that the SEC implemented in Rule 1OA-3.1 74 Rule 10A-3
requires publicly traded companies to have independent audit com-
mittees that have established procedures for reviewing complaints,
allowing confidential submissions of concerns about accounting or
auditing violations, and also requires that the committee have the
authority to retain independent counsel or other advisors.17 5 As a
result, the concern highlighted by the Eighth Circuit that disallowing
limited waiver of attorney-client privilege would keep corporations
from obtaining independent audits or independent counsel no longer
applies in today's business climate.
The validity of the Eighth Circuit's point is further undermined
by the ever increasing use of internal investigations by corporations. 1 6
Because corporations' regular practice now includes creating internal
investigations, 77 courts should not create rules of law simply to
ensure this practice continues. All of the changes in law and in corpo-
rate governance that have occurred since 1977 point to the conclu-
sion that the selective waiver doctrine is not necessary to ensure that
corporations retain independent counsel and investigate their own
possible accounting violations: The law already requires corporations
to do this.
171 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 404 (distinguishing evidence admissible in criminal cases
relating to character).
172 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).
173 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West 1997 & Supp.
2006).
174 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2006).
175 Id.
176 See Anne C. Flannery &Jennifer S. Milano, The Confusion Continues: Protection of
Internal Corporate Investigation Materials Under the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Prod-
uct Doctrine, Revisited, 1023 PLI/Corp 519, 523 (1997).
177 Id.
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Additionally, and most importantly, the limited waiver doctrine
does not further the policy underlying attorney-client privilege. The
ultimate purpose of this privilege is to encourage clients to speak
freely with their attorneys. 78 When a corporation, after disclosing
information to its attorney, decides to disclose the same information
to third parties, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege has
already been satisfied. Because clients choose when they will or will
not disclose privileged material to a third party, a waiver of privilege as
a result of such a disclosure in no way affects the corporation's initial
decision to consult with its attorney. Waiver of this privilege is in the
hands of the client, to do with as it pleases. No matter what choice a
corporation makes about subsequent disclosure, providing for waiver
of the privilege upon disclosure provides no deterrent for the corpo-
ration to discuss the underlying legal issues with its attorney. This
argument holds true whether or not the corporation negotiates with
the government for a confidentiality agreement, because at that point
it has already conferred with its attorney.
Thus, courts in undecided circuits, although free to do as they
choose as of now, should not apply the limited waiver doctrine
espoused by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified. Upon disclosure to the
government of material once protected by attorney-client privilege,
the privilege ought not apply in subsequent litigation, regardless of
any confidentiality agreements the corporation may have entered into
with the government.
B. Should Courts Apply Sixth or Second Circuit Precedent
When Handling Work Product Waiver Issues?
Courts have the option of choosing to follow either the Sixth or
the Second Circuit's lead when faced with waiver of work product pro-
tection. If a court applies Sixth Circuit precedent, it will follow the
rule that when a corporation discloses protected material to the gov-
ernment, and the government can be considered an adversary, the
material will no longer be protected from discovery by third parties,
despite any other circumstances. 179 If a court follows the example of
the Second Circuit, it will allow work product protection to stand
where the corporation has entered into a confidentiality agreement
178 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
179 Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.
(In re Colurnbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289, 304-06
(6th Cir. 2002).
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with the government, protecting the work product from discovery by
third parties. 180
Examination of the policy underlying the work product doctrine
provides support for the Second Circuit's approach to this issue,
which allows protection when the parties have entered a confidential-
ity agreement. The Supreme Court explained that the work product
doctrine is meant to restrict opposing counsel's ability to piggyback
on an attorney's work. 8" It is also meant to ensure that attorneys can
effectively represent their clients without worrying about discovery of
their work in the future.1 82 The court wanted to ensure that attorneys
felt free to write their work down.'8 3 The law provides for waiver of
this protection upon voluntary disclosure to an adversary, 84 and the
parties are free to choose whether they disclose in this way.
These policies underlying work product protection do not neces-
sarily demand that waiver should apply when the disclosing party has
negotiated for confidentiality. A client's determination to provide
work product to the government should not lead to the conclusion
that any other opposing party should also be able to take advantage of
the attorney's work. If the attorney has taken appropriate steps to
maintain the confidentiality of the information as to third parties,
then the attorney has not violated the policy underlying work product
protection through such a disclosure. The attorney may have allowed
the government to benefit from his work, but this does not imply that
the attorney should allow every other opposing counsel the same ben-
efit. As a result, the policy reasons for protecting work product still
apply to other adversaries.
Additionally, third parties seeking discovery of material disclosed
to the government have the option of arguing that discovery of pro-
tected material is appropriate where there is a substantial need for the
materials and the information cannot be obtained any other way.' 8 5
This is the same rule that would apply if these parties were the first to
180 Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, L.P. (In re Steinhardt Part-
ners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993).
181 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975).
185 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12. This brings up the issue, however, of how future
adversaries will even know what sort of information is disclosed in the protected docu-
ments in order to argue that there is a substantial need for the materials and that the
information cannot be obtained through other means. Given that this issue is com-
mon to all cases where discovery of any sort of work product is desired, this issue is
one that is not unique to this particular situation.
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attempt to discover otherwise protected attorney work product. 86
Thus, the provision of work product to the government would have no
effect on the ability of third parties to discover such materials.
This rule will also encourage corporations to cooperate with the
government. If corporations feel confident that their attorney work
product will remain confidential as to third parties, they are more
likely to disclose it to the government, a "laudable activity" in the eyes
of the Second Circuit.18 7 Encouraging cooperation with the govern-
ment will make it easier for agencies like the SEC and the DOJ to
investigate corporations and ensure compliance with criminal and
securities laws.
As a result, courts will uphold the policy underlying the work
product doctrine by following the lead of the Second Circuit in
Salmon Brothers and allowing retention of work product protection
where the corporation has entered into a confidentiality agreement
with the SEC.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the many different approaches to the doctrines of
waiver of attorney-client privilege and waiver of work product protec-
tion shows that the best approach is that taken by the Second Circuit
and, most recently, by the Northern District of California. Allowing
corporations to selectively waive attorney client privilege does not
comport with the policy underlying the privilege, but allowing work
product protection to stand after disclosure under a confidentiality
agreement does not violate the policy goals of work product protec-
tion. This approach also encourages corporations to cooperate with
the government. Given that this issue is not settled, corporations and
their attorneys must be aware that many courts have the option to pick
and choose which rules they will apply. As a result of this uncertainty,
attorneys should advise their corporate clients of the different pos-
sibilities and, if their clients choose to disclose protected materials to
the government, should negotiate with the government for a confi-
dentiality agreement in order to protect their client as much as possi-
ble. Until the Supreme Court decides what rules will ultimately
govern these issues, attorneys must prepare their clients for all possi-
ble situations.
186 Id.
187 Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, L.P. (In re Steinhardt Part-
ners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Perrnian Corp. v. United States, 665
F.2d 1214, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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